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PRECEDENTS
tion's leading arbitrators, has just recently collaborated in the
preparation of a case-book made up of selected arbitration
awards?
Still, the degree to which the decisions of other arbitrators
"offer relevant experience"4 to a pending labor problem varies
widely with the phase of labor relations involved. The issues
commonly present in discipline and discharge cases are more
nearly comparable throughout industry; and in the resolution
of these issues arbitrators employ concepts familiar to law stu-
dents. Hence, this initial law journal venture in the annotation
of labor arbitration awards has been confined to such cases.
It is hoped that, despite its inherent limitations, this experi-
mental offering will profit those readers who participate, or have
an interest, in labor relations. ELMER E. HiLPERTf
GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
The power of employers to discharge, or otherwise discipline,
their employees has been greatly curtailed in recent years. At
common law, a contract of employment which stated no express
term of employment was terminable at the will of either party.,
Tenure of employment was thus largely at the sole discretion
of the employer. The impact of trade unionism has wrought a
tremendous change. Legislation has imposed some limitations.
Thus, the discharge or discipline of employees because of their
union activity has been prohibited by Congress 2 and by some
state legislatures? The collective bargaining agreement, now
common in American industry, usually provides that discipline
and discharge shall be imposed only for "cause" and that dis-
puted cases shall be submitted to arbitration. It is these pro-
visions that constitute the broader and more effective circum-
3. Shulman & Chamberlain, Cases on Labor Relations (1949). For a
review of which, see infra.
4. Tilove, Robert, "Foreword" to Gollub's Discharge for Cause.
t Professor of Law, Washington University School of Law. Arbitrator
in various labor disputes.
1. 161 ALR 706; Note (1942) 42 Col. L. Rev. 107; (1927) 40 Harv. L.
Rev. 646; (1923) 32 Yale L. J. 850; Restatement, Agency (1933) sec. 442.
2. National Labor Relations Act. (1935) 49 Stat. 449, c. 372, 29 U.S.C.A.
sees. 151-158, 159-166; Labor Management Relations Act. (1947) 61 Stat.
136, c. 120, tit. I, sec. 101, 29 U.S.C.A. secs. 151-167.
3. See e. g., The Wisconsin Employment Peace Act. Wis. STAT., c. 111,
§§111.01-111.65 (1947).
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scription of the hitherto unrestrained power to discipline and
discharge employees.
The general effect of these developments on American indus-
try, as this is reflected in arbitration awards, is the subject of
this note. Later notes will deal with more detailed phases of
the discipline and discharge of employees under collective bar-
gaining agreements.
I. POSITION OF EMPLOYER, EMPLOYEE AND UNION OFFICER
It is basic that every sort of enterprise, if it is to function
at all, requires that someone be vested with authority to run it.
In American industry, such authority inheres in the employer.
Collective bargaining agreements do not dispute the location of
this authority, and often expressly "vest" it in management;4
but they do restrict managerial power to discipline and discharge
employees in order to prevent an abuse of this authority. Thus,
the right of management to give orders and directions remains,
but it is qualified by the grievance procedures established in
collective bargaining agreements. Moreover, it is incumbent on
management, in the exercise of its admitted powers, to use
humane discretion in imposing disciplinary action and to take
into account the employee's physical condition, his prior record,
his attitude toward his work, and many other factors.
The new right of the employee, and of the union official, is
to resort to the grievance procedure to question the propriety
of managerial action. Grievance procedures exist to redress
grievances; they do not exist to divest management of its proper
sphere of authority8 An industrial plant is not a "debating
society" ;7 production cannot be halted while employer and em-
ployee discuss a proposed course of action. Thus, a union corn-
4. A fairly standard CIO Management Clause reads:
"The management of works and the direction of the working forcesincluding the right to hire, suspend, discipline or discharge for proper
cause, or transfer and the right to relieve employees from duty because
of lack of work or for other legitimate reasons is vested exclusively in
the Company; Provided that this will not be used for purposes of dis-
crimination against any member of the union."5. In re Campbell, Wyant and Cannon Foundry Company and Inter-
national Union, United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement
Workers of America, Local 539 (CIO), 1 LA 254 (1945).6. In re Ford Motor Company, Spring and Upset Building and Inter-
national Union, United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement
Workers of America, Local 539 (CIO), 1 LA 254 (1945).
7. Ibid.
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mitteeman may not direct or advise an employee to disobey
supervisory instructions, and an employee cannot refuse to carry
out a management order because he believes it to be improper
or the violation of a contract right. If either does so, he is
properly subject to discipline. The grievance procedure con-
templates that there will be claimed violations of contract or
other grievances that will require adjustment. The only real
difference between what the employee and union official believe
to be a "clear" violation and a doubtful one is that the former
makes a clear grievance and the latter a doubtful one."
"Self-help" is allowable only if the managerial order would
require the performance of an illegal or criminal act or when
it would involve exposure to an unusual hazard to life or health.9
In such situations, which will be rare, the employee's or union
official's refusal to obey management's orders will be excused.10
A difficult question is presented when the contract reserves
to the union the exclusive power to discipline its officers, since
union officers are also frequently employees. In In re Symington-
Gould Corporation,"' a union committeeman deliberately caused
a work stoppage, which was in violation of contract; and the
union president, who had neither caused nor participated in the
work stoppage, refused to order the men involved to return t6
work. The company discharged both men. In the ensuing arbi-
tration proceeding, the union contended that it had sole juris-
diction to discipline these men because their misconduct con-
sisted of a failure, as union officers, to enforce the union's con-
tract obligations. The arbitrator found that the union com-
mitteeman had acted in a dual capacity and that he was, there-
fore, subject to company discipline. On the other hand, the arbi-
trator sustained the union's contention as to the union president,
since he had acted only in his representative capacity, and held
that he was not subject to company discipline. Thus, while there
may be a clear division of jurisdiction, the mere fact that an
employee is an official of the union is no cloak of immunity from
the disciplinary power of management.
8. Ibid.
9. In re American Car & Foundry Company, St. Charles Plant and
United Steelworkers of America, Local 2409 (CIO), 10 LA 324, 329-330,
334 (1948).
10. Ibid.
11. In re Symington-Gould Corporation, Depew Works and United Steel-
workers of America, Local 1630 (CIO), 9 LA 819 (1949).
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II. POSITION OF THE ARBITRATOR
Collective bargaining agreements may, but seldom do, specify
the grounds for which an employee may be discharged or dis-
ciplined; and, similarly, they seldom spell out in detail what
penalties are to be invoked for particular infractions of man-
agerial policy, practice or rules. Indeed, there is no discernible
pattern in collective bargaining agreements in this regard, un-
less it be in the general limitation that discharge and discipline
shall be "proper," only for "cause," or shall not be "unfair,"
"discriminatory," or the like. In this situation, the arbitrator
generally finds himself in the position of having to weigh and
determine, in the light of all the surrounding circumstances,
whether an industrial offense has in fact been committed, the
gravity of the offense, whether there are mitigating circum-
tsances, and what, if any, is an appropriate penalty.1 2
A contrary view has been expressed in some few cases. Thus,
in In re Perkins Oil Co., 3 the arbitrator held that
Where, as in this case, no schedule of offenses and pun-
ishment has been put into effect, either by agreement, by
company rules, or by practice, the penalty to be imposed for
an offense rests in the sound discretion of management.
Arbitrators have no right to substitute their judgment for
that of management except where there has been such an
abuse of discretion. While the writer, if he had had Mr.
Holly's decision to make in the first place, might have im-
posed a ten-day lay-off instead of discharge, it does not fol-
low that discharge was unreasonable or an abuse of discre-
tion, especially in view of the admitted warning.
The same arbitrator has ruled to the same effect in In re Stock-
ham Pipe Fitting Company,'- where he said
The only circumstances under which a penalty imposed
by management can be rightfully set aside by an arbitrator
are those where discrimination, unfairness, or capricious
and arbitrary action are proved-in other words, where
there has been abuse of discretion.
12. See notes on particular bases for discipline and discharge, infra.
13. In re Perkins Oil Company and Food, Tobacco, Agricultural and
Allied Workers of America, Local 19 (CIO), 1 LA 447 (1946) (offense
was union solicitation on company time).
14. In re Stockham Pipe Fittings Company and United Steelworkers
of America (CIO), 1 LA 160 (1945) (offense was fighting on the job and
the facts seem to have justified discharge here).
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The opposite point of view is elaborately set out in In re Ameri-
can Car & Foundry Co.15
This fundamental difference in point of view is sharply pre-
sented in In re Bakelite Corporation.6 The arbitrator in this
case was confronted with the usual contract provision which
stated that management might discharge or discipline "for
proper cause." But another, and unusual, contract provision, in
Article IX of the contract, expressly provided that "The arbi-
tration committee shall not have power . . . to substitute its
judgment for that of management unless it finds that the Com-
pany has acted arbitrarily or without reason or in violation of
this agreement."'17 Despite this, the arbitrator reinstated certain
discharged employees, because he felt that the penalty was too
severe in all the circumstances, stating that
... a rigid interpretation of the limitation of Art. 9 of the
contract would so vitiate the spirit and purpose of the col-
lective bargaining agreement as to leave the arbitration
procedure a mere form and that a determination that a dis-
charge was not justified could be concluded without violation
of the agreement in the absence of a specific determination
that the action was arbitrary or without reason.'18
Of course, when a company and a union do provide, by agree-
ment, or by acquiesced-in plant rules or practice, for a schedule
of offenses and penalties, the arbitrator will be bound thereby.9
But even here, arbitrators have found that such a schedule of
offenses requires "interpretation" and the schedule of penalties
is subject to rules of "amelioration.'2o
III. ARBITRATION UNDER LAPSED AGREEMENT
Since the union's and employees' right to insist that discharge
and discipline be imposed only for "cause" rests, in the main,
on the collective bargaining agreement, it is arguable that, upon,
and during, the lapse of such agreement, such right is in abey-
15. In re American Car & Foundry Company, St. Charles Plant and
United Steelworkers of America, Local 2409 (CIO), 10 LA 324, 334-335(1948).
16. In re Bakelite Corporation and Chemical & Crafts Union, Inc., 1
LA 227 (1945).
17. Id. at 229.
18. Id. at 229.
19. In re American Car & Foundry Company, St. Charles Plant and
United Steelworkers of America, Local 2409 (CIO), 10 LA 324, 331 (1948).20. See notes on particular bases for discipline and discharge, infra.
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ance. This has been held in In re Fruehauf Trailer Company.21
Under this view, the employees are remanded to such redress as
may be found in processing an "unfair labor" practice under
the federal or state labor relations acts, wherein the relief is
limited to discipline or discharge that involve, in the main, dis-
crimination because of union activity.
However, it may be questioned as to whether the view ex-
pressed by the arbitrator in the Fruehauf Case is realistic.
Labor-management contracts do have terminal dates; but the
union, if "certified," or otherwise "recognized," as the "exclusive
bargaining agency," continues to have "rights" and "powers,"
both as against the employer and its members after a contract
has "lapsed." Moreover, in that situation, it is contemplated
that the company and the union will, at some later date, enter
into a "new" agreement. The negotiations pending the new
agreement are generally concerned with wage increases or the
securing of other "improved working conditions." Meanwhile,
both the company and the Union wish to, and do, continue plant
operations under the terms and conditions of the allegedly
"lapsed" agreement. In these circumstances, it would be far
better for all concerned to consider many provisions of the
"lapsed" agreement as still being in force and effect. Certainly
among these, would be the provisions relating to "job security"
and the processing of grievances with respect thereto. This
seems to be the well-recognized practice in industry, despite the
dearth of "precedents" on the precise point ;22 and it is sub-
mitted that this view should prevail as being conducive to in-
dustrial peace.
IV. EFFECT OF OTHER CONTRACT LIMITATIONS ON
MANAGERIAL POWER OVER PERSONNEL
In addition to the general limitation on managerial power,
arising from the requirement that discipline and discharge shall
be imposed only for "cause," labor-management contracts con-
tain other limitations on managerial power over personnel. The
principle of interpretation which seems to be followed, however,
is that managerial power is residual and that, hence, it is not
21. In re Fruehauf Trailer Company and United Automobile, Aircraft
and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, Local 99 (CIO), '4 LA
399 (1946).
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limited except as expressly provided or as arises from necessary
implication from the contract as a whole.
Thus, a contract limiting the right of management to dis-
charge for cause, but imposing no express limitation on other
forms of discipline, does not deprive the employer of power to
impose such lesser penalties. 3 The contrary result has, however,
been reached2 4 on the basis of the maxim expressio unius est
exclusio alterius. The latter result seems clearly wrong.
Similarly, it has been held that a company retains its power
to lay-off25 or discharge,' an employee during a probationary
period, unless the contract expressly provides otherwise. In this
situation, however, a company is not free to discipline or dis-
charge a probationary employee under circumstances that vio-
late the union security clauses2 7 or the National Labor Relations
Act.2 1 So too, the limitation on management's power to sever
the employment relation for reasons of economy is not limited
by a contract requirement that discipline and discharge shall
be only for "cause, ' 21 although arbitrable cases might arise
22. See to this effect, In re Daily World Publishing Company and The
Newspaper Guild of Philadelphia and Camden, Local 10 (CIO), 3 LA
815 (1946), but compare In re Benrus Watch Company and Waterbury
Brassworkers Union, Local 251, 1 ALAA 11 67,225 (1945).
23. In re Auto-Lite Battery Corporation, Owen Dyneto Division and
United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of
America (CIO), 3 LA 122 (1946).
24. In re Reynolds Alloys Company and Aluminum Workers Federal
Labor Union, No. 22724 (AFL), 2 LA 554 (1943).
25. In re Flintkote Company and Textile Workers Union of America,
Local 655 (CIO), 3 LA 770 (1946).
26. In re Luckenbach Steamship Company, Inc. and International Long-
shoremen's & Warehousemen's Union, Ship Clerks' Local 34 (CIO), 6
LA 98 (1946); In re Philadelphia Company, Equitable Real Estate Com-
pany, Equitable Sales Company, Duquesne Light Company, Allegheny
County Steam Heating Company, Cheswick and Harmar Railroad Com-
pany, Equitable Auto Company, Equitable Gas Company, Finleyville Oil
and Gas Company, Philadelphia Oil Company, Pittsburgh and West Vir-
ginia Gas Company, and W. D. George and Thomas Fitzgerald, Trustees
for Pittsburgh Railways Company, debtor, and for Pittsburgh Motor Coach
Company, subsidiary, and Independent Association of Employees of Du-
quesne Light Company and Associated Companies, 6 LA 470 (1947).
27. Ibid.
28. In re Flintkote Company and Textile Workers Union of America,
Local 655 (CIO), 3 LA 770 (1946).
29. In re PM and Newspaper Guild of New York and American News-
paper Guild (CIO), 3 LA 683 (1946); In re New York Tribune, Inc. and
American Newspaper Guild, Newspaper Guild of New York, Local 3 (CIO),
8 LA 410 (1947).
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under lay-offs for economy reasons under the seniority provi-
sions of the contract.30
Management's exercise of its right to discipline or discharge
for cause frequently involves seemingly unrelated provisions of
the labor-management contract; and here the arbitrators are
often met with difficult problems of reconciling separate contract
provisions so as to give sensible effect to the whole. For ex-
ample: an employee was properly disciplined for "absentee-
ism" on a given Monday. The penalty imposed by the company
was the deprivation of over-time pay for work performed on
Saturday of that week. The arbitrator sustained the company's
action on the ground that the deprivation of over-time pay for
Saturday, while literally a violation of the over-time provisions
of the contract, was here a properly imposed disciplinary pen-
alty.31 To much the same effect, a company was sustained for
denying an employee his "equal opportunity to participate in
over-time" as a penalty for excessive "absenteeism.1 32 Nor do
these examples exhaust the possibilities.
Although labor-management contracts do fall into somewhat
of a "pattern," they are complex, often quite detailed, and touch
on a large variety of matters. They also vary to a great degree
from industry to industry and union to union. Hence, in the
final analysis, even in discipline and discharge cases, the arbi-
trator will do well to relate the facts of the case before him as
much to the contract involved as to the "precedents" available
from other arbitration cases.
REXFORD H. CARUTHERS
30. See seniority cases collected in Bureau of National Affairs, Com-
merce Clearing House and Prentice-Hall.
31. In re Roberts and Mander Stove Company and United Steelworkers
of America, Local 1839 (CIO), 3 LA 656 (1946).
32. In re Ingersoll-Rand Company and United Electrical, Radio &
Machine Workers of America, Local 313 (CIO), 7 LA 564 (1947).
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